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Abstract
Recent work in traffic analysis has shown that traffic patterns leaked through side channels can be
used to recover important semantic information. For instance, attackers can find out which website, or
which page on a website, a user is accessing simply by monitoring the packet size distribution. We show
that traffic analysis is even a greater threat to privacy than previously thought by introducing a new attack
that can be carried out remotely. In particular, we show that, to perform traffic analysis, adversaries do
not need to directly observe the traffic patterns. Instead, they can gain sufficient information by sending
probes from a far-off vantage point that exploits a queuing side channel in routers.
To demonstrate the threat of such remote traffic analysis, we study a remote website detection attack
that works against home broadband users. Because the remotely observed traffic patterns are more noisy
than those obtained using previous schemes based on direct local traffic monitoring, we take a dynamic
time warping (DTW) based approach to detecting fingerprints from the same website. As a new twist
on website fingerprinting, we consider a website detection attack, where the attacker aims to find out
whether a user browses a particular web site, and its privacy implications. We show experimentally that,
although the success of the attack is highly variable, depending on the target site, for some sites very low
error rates. We also show how such website detection can be used to deanonymize message board users.
1 Introduction
Traffic analysis is the practice of inferring sensitive information from patterns of communication. Recent
research has shown that traffic analysis applied to network communications can be used to compromise
users’ secrecy and privacy. By using packet sizes, timings, and counts, it is possible to fingerprint websites
visited over an encrypted tunnel [2,4,11,17], infer keystrokes sent over a secure interactive connection [27,
34] and even detect phrases in VoIP sessions [31–33]. These attacks have been explored in the context of a
local adversary who can observe the target traffic directly on a shared network link or can monitor a wireless
network from a nearby vantage point [25].
We consider an alternate traffic analysis approach that is available to remote adversaries. We notice
that it is possible to infer the state of a router’s queue through the observed queueing delay of a probe
packet. By sending frequent probes, the attacker can measure the dynamics of the queue and thus learn
an approximation of the sizes, timings, and counts of packets arriving at the router. In the case of home
broadband networks, in particular, DSL lines, the attacker can send probe packets from a geographically
distant vantage point, located as far away as another country; the large gap between the bandwidth of the
DSL line and the rest of the Internet path makes it possible to isolate the queueing delay of the “last-mile”
hop from that experienced elsewhere.
To demonstrate the feasibility of using remote traffic analysis for real malicious attack to learn sensitive
information, we adapt the website fingerprinting attack [2, 11, 17], previously targeted at local victims, to a
new scenario and introduce a remote website detection attack. Our attack can find out when a victim user
under observation visits a particular target site without directly monitoring the user’s traffic. This would
allow, for example, a company to find out when its employees visit its competitors’ sites from their home
computers or deanonymize users of web boards.
In our adaptation, we encountered two challenges: the information obtained through remote traffic anal-
ysis is more noisy than in the local case, and there is no easily available training set from which to create
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Figure 1: Queueing side channel
a fingerprint. To address the former problem, we improved on the previous inference methodology, which
used the distribution of packet sizes and inter-arrival times, and developed a fingerprint detection technique
that makes use of ordered packet size sequences and the dynamic time warping (DTW) distance metric. To
create a training set, we designed a testbed that uses an emulated DSL link and a virtual execution environ-
ment to replicate the victim’s home environment.
To evaluate our work, we sent probes to a home DSL line in the United States from a rented server in
a data center near Montreal, Canada; we chose this set up to demonstrate the low cost and barrier to entry
to conduct the attack. We then compared the probe results with profiles of website fetches generated in a
virtual testbed at our university. We tested our attack on detecting each of a list of 1 000 popular websites.
We found that detection performance was highly variable; however, for a significant fraction of sites, it was
possible to obtain very low false-positive rates without incurring significant false negatives. We also found
that there is some accuracy loss due to the discrepancies in the test and training environments (distant from
each other) that we were not (yet) able to eliminate. If the training and test data are both collected from the
same location, a much larger fraction of sites can be accurately detected with low error rates. We find that
despite working with a much noisier information source than previous web fingerprinting work [2, 11, 17],
our website detection attack nevertheless shows that remote traffic analysis is a serious threat to Internet
privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our approach to remote traffic analysis in §2.
In §3 we describe our adaptation of previous website fingerprinting attack to remotely confirming user’s
browsing activities. We evaluate our website detection attack in §4. We then discuss further extensions and
the limitations of our technique in §5 and present related work in §6, concluding in §7.
2 Remote Traffic Analysis
Traffic analysis attacks have been known to be effective for quite some time. And yet, for most Internet
users, they represent a minor concern at best. Although a dedicated attacker could always intercept traffic
by, say, bribing a rogue ISP employee, or tapping a switch box, he would run the risk of being caught and
potentially incurring criminal charges. In any case, this level of effort seems justified only for highly sensi-
tive material, rather than casual snooping; therefore, as long as sensitive data are protected by encryption or
other techniques, a user may feel relatively safe.
We show, however, that traffic analysis can be carried out at a significantly lower cost, and by attackers
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who never come into physical proximity with the user. In fact, the attackers can launch their attacks from
another state or country, as long as they have access to a well-provisioned Internet connection. This, in turn,
is very easy to obtain due to the highly-competitive Internet hosting business sector: a virtual private server
in a data center can cost as little as a few dollars a month.1 We show that the attacker’s traffic is very low
rate, thus attackers do not need to incur high bandwidth costs. Furthermore, users who are being spied upon
are unlikely to notice the small amount of performance overhead. Thus, anyone with a credit card2 can carry
out the attack and leave little trace.
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Figure 2: Real traffic on a DSL vs. probe RTTs. Alice
resides in some town in US. Bob is located in Monte-
real, Canada.
In this section, we describe our approach to re-
mote traffic analysis. We first introduce the queue-
ing side channel, which is the basis of the attack.
Then we design an algorithm to recover users’ traf-
fic patterns from the information leaked through
this side channel.
2.1 Queuing Side Channel
We consider the following scenario. Alice is a home
user at Sometown USA, browsing a website via her
DSL Internet connection. Her computer is con-
nected to a broadband router, using a wireless or
wired LAN connection.3 The router is connected
via a DSL line to a DSLAM4 or similar device op-
erated by her ISP, which is then (eventually) con-
nected to the Internet. Unbeknownst to Alice, Bob,
who is located in another state, or another country
wishes to attack Alice’s privacy. If Bob knows Al-
ice’s IP address (for example, if Alice visited a site
hosted by Bob), he can use his computer to send a
series of ICMP echo requests (pings) to the router in
Alice’s house and monitor the responses to compute
the round-trip times (RTTs). One component of the
RTTs is the queueing delay that the packets experi-
ence at the DSLAM prior to being transmitted over
the DSL line; thus the RTTs leak information about
the DSLAM queue size. This leakage in turn re-
veals traffic patterns pertaining to Alice’s activities.
Since the probe packets traverse many Internet
links, and the queuing delays on Alice’s DSL link
are but one component of the RTT, the question is,
how much information is leaked by this side chan-
nel? Furthermore, can it be used to infer any in-
formation about Alice’s activities? To evaluate the
potential of this attack, we carried out a test on a
home DSL link located in the USA. In the test, Alice opens a Web page www.yahoo.com on her computer.
Simultaneously, Bob in Canada sends a ping request every 10 ms to Alice’s home router. Figure 2(a) depicts
1See, for example, www.vpslink.com (retrieved February 2011).
2Working stolen credit cards are an easily acquired commodity on the black market [10].
3In some cases, Alice’s computer might be connected to the DSL line directly.
4DSL access multiplexer
3
(a) Empirical CDF of ping RTTs from a typical host. (b) Empirical CDF of 95th percentile minus minimum RTTs.
Figure 3: Measurement of DSL Probe Variance
Table 1: RTTs measured by pinging from worldwide advantage points (in ms)
Node Mean StdDev
planet6.cs.ucsb.edu 66.590 0.543
pl1.rcc.uottawa.ca 42.936 0.619
pl1.grid.kiae.ru 153.205 0.749
planetlab2.c3sl.ufpr.br 177.318 0.868
planet2.pnl.nitech.ac.jp 197.043 0.567
pl1.eng.monash.edu.au 221.460 1.784
planetlab1.xeno.cl.cam.ac.uk 319.752 2.297
planetlab2.comp.nus.edu.sg 291.193 4.221
the traffic pattern of Alice’s download traffic. The height of each peak in the figure represents the total
size of packets that are downloaded during each 10 ms interval. Figure 2(b) plots the RTTs of Bob’s ping
requests. We can see a visual correlation between the traffic pattern and observed RTTs; whenever there is
a large peak in the user’s traffic, the attacker observes a correspondingly large RTT.
The correlation between Alice’s traffic and Bob’s observed probe RTTs can be explained as follows. The
RTTs include both the queuing delay incurred on the DSL link and delays on intermediate routers, which
sit between Bob’s computer and Alice’s router. The intermediate routers are typically well provisioned and
are unlikely to experience congestion [1, 16]; furthermore, the intermediate links have high bandwidth and
thus queueing delays will be small in all cases. We validate this using our own measurements in the next
subsection.
On the other hand, Alice’s DSL link is, by far, the slowest link that both her traffic and Bob’s probe are
likely to traverse. The queues at Alice’s router can grow to be quite long (in relative terms), due to TCP
behaviors, which cause the www.yahoo.com server to send a batch of TCP packets at a fast rate. As most
routers schedule packets in a First In First Out (FIFO) manner, this congestion will leads to large queuing
delays of Bob’s ping packets. We saw that the additional delay caused by Alice’s incoming traffic could be
as high as over 100 ms. Thus, Alice’s traffic patterns are clearly visible in the RTTs.
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2.2 Measurement of DSL Probe Variance
To further confirm that the fluctuation of user’s RTTs are primarily determined by the congestion at the
DSL link, we conducted a small Internet measurement study. We harvested IP addresses from access logs
of servers run by the authors. We noted that many DSL providers assign a DNS name containing “dsl” to
customers. Using reverse DNS lookups, we were able to locate 918 potential DSL hosts. To determine
each host’s suitability for measurement, we first determine if it responds to ping requests. We then use
traceroute to locate the hop before the target DSL host (e.g., the DSLAM). Next, we ensure this previous
hop also responds to ping requests. Lastly, we measure the minimum RTT of several hundred ping probes.
We exclude any host with a minimum RTT of greater than 100ms to bound the study to hosts in a wide
geographical area around our Montreal, Canada probe server. Using this method, we identified 189 DSL
hosts to measure. The measurement consists of sending ping probes every 2 ms for 30 seconds to the target
DSL host and then to its previous hop. We collected these traces in a loop over a period of several hours.
We found that, on average, the target host RTT was∼10 ms greater than the previous hop. We frequently
observed the pattern in Figure 3(a) where the previous hop RTT was very stable and target RTT variations
greater than 10 ms. We then measured the span between the 95th percentile and the minimum observation
in each sample. Figure 3(b) shows the CDFs of this data for the each target DSL host and its previous hop
from the measurement set. We observe that the previous hop RTT span shows more stability than the end
host, confirming the one of the primary assumptions of our work.
To confirm the feasibility of learning the target user’s traffic remotely (from another city, or even another
country), we examined the RTTs from advantage points across different locations. In this experiment, we
used a series of PlanetLab nodes located in 8 countries to send frequent ping requests to a DSL IP address in
US, while keeping the host behind the DSL idle; i.e., no background traffic went through the DSL link. The
measured RTT standard deviations, as listed in Table 1, thus represented the background noises for learning
target traffic patterns. Recall in the queuing side channel, the user’s traffic patterns are leaked through the
extra delays experienced by the probe ping packets. On a common home DSL link with download speed of
3 Mbps, the delay induced by one packet with size of 1500 bytes is about 4 ms. This is much higher than
the standard deviations of RTTs at the first 5 nodes. Therefore, the traffic patterns would survive well in
the RTTs observed on those nodes. In fact, many of the patterns we observe involve multiple back-to-back
packets, creating extra delay of tens or even hundreds of milliseconds. Such patterns would be detectable
even on the worst of these links, although for best quality of attack, the attacker should pick a vantage point
relatively close to the target (e.g., same continent).
2.3 Traffic Pattern Recovery Algorithm
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Figure 4: FIFO queuing in the DSL router
We now show how the attacker can analyze the in-
formation leaked through this queueing side chan-
nel. We model the incoming DSL link as a FIFO
queue. As most traffic volume in an HTTP ses-
sion occurs on the download side, we will ignore the
queuing behavior on the outgoing DSL link, though
it could be modeled in a similar fashion.
Figure 4 depicts the arrival and departure pro-
cess in this queuing system. The arrows are Bob’s
ping packets, denoted by Pi’s, and the blocks rep-
resent HTTP packets downloaded by Alice. The
DSLAM serves packets in FIFO manner and at a constant service rate; i.e., the service time is propor-
tional to the packet size. As most HTTP packets are more than an order of magnitude larger than ping
packets, we ignore the service time for pings.
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Algorithm 1 Traffic pattern recovery algorithm
1: let t′0 = 0
2: for i = 1 to the probe sequence length do
3: # reconstruct the arrival and departure times
4: ti = tping · i
5: t′i = RTTi −RTTmin + ti
6: # estimate the total size of packets arriving in [ti−1, ti]
7: ŝi = t
′
i −max(t′i−1, ti)
8: # discard noise
9: if ŝi < η then
10: ŝi = 0
11: end if
12: end for
Assume that ping packet Pi arrives in the queue at time ti, waits for the router to serve all the packets
currently in the router, and then departs at time t′i. Let us consider the observed RTT of the ping packet Pi;
we can represent it as:
RTTi =
∑
l∈links on path
qli + t
l
i + p
l
i (1)
where qli, p
l
i, and t
l
i are the queueing, propagation, and transmission delays incurred by packet Pi on link l.
Note that the propagation and transmission delays are mostly constant, and in fact we can approximate:∑
l∈links on path
tli + p
l
i ≈ min
j
RTTj (2)
since Bob is likely to experience near-zero queueing delays for some of the pings. Furthermore, as argued
in §2.1, the queueing delay on links other than the DSL line are going to be minimal, thus we can further
approximate:
RTTi ≈ min
j
RTTj + (t
′
i − ti) (3)
Making use of the queuing delay t′i − ti from (3), the attacker Bob can further infer the total size of HTTP
packets arriving during the interval [ti−1, ti]’s, which produces a similar pattern as Alice’s traffic in Fig-
ure 2(a). For this purpose, two cases need to be considered.
1. ti ≥ t′i−1. In this case, when Pi enters the queue, the DSLAM is either idle or serving packets destined
for Alice. The delay t′i − ti reflects the time required to finish serving the HTTP packets currently
in the buffer, and is thus approximately proportional to the total size of Alice’s arrivals during the
interval [ti−1, ti]. P2 in Figure 4 is one example of this case.
2. ti < t′i−1. In this case, Pi−1 is still in the queue when Pi arrives. Only after Pi−1 departs at t
′
i−1, the
router can start to serve packets that arrived in the interval [ti−1, ti]. Thus the delay t′i − t′i−1 is the
service time for those packets and can be used to recover the total size. P4 in Figure 4 is one example
of this case.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the traffic pattern recovery procedure based on these observations. To account
for minor queueing delays experienced on other links, we define a threshold η such that RTT variations
smaller than η are considered noise and do not correspond to any packet arrival at the DSLAM. Figure 2(c)
plots the pattern extracted from RTTs in Figure 2(b). After processing, the resulting time series proportion-
ally approximate the packet size sequence of the original traffic in Figure 2(a). As will be shown in the next
section, it can be applied to infer more information about Alice’s activities, e.g., website fingerprinting.
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Note that in case 1, the attacker may underestimate the size of the HTTP packets arriving in the period
[ti−1, ti] because a portion of them will have already been serviced by time ti. The error depends both on
the frequency of the probes and the bandwidth of the DSL link. Since most HTTP packets are of max-
imal size (MTU), we can ensure that all such packets are observed by setting the ping period to be less
than: MTUDSL bandwidth .Thus the adversary must tune the probe rate based on the DSL bandwidth and faster links
will require a higher bandwidth overhead (but the pings will form a constant, small fraction of the overall
DSL bandwidth.)
2.4 Properties
Our remote traffic analysis attack has the following properties that are different from traditional local traffic
analysis techniques:
Remote vantage point The attacker does not need to physically capture the target traffic flow. He can
launch this attack from almost anywhere, even different states or counties from the target user.
Low cost The attacker can perform this attack as long as he has access to a well-provisioned Internet con-
nection. Moreover, the probe traffic has a very low rate, e.g., 50 Kbps for 100 pings per second. Thus
the attacker does not need to incur considerable bandwidth costs, and victims are unlikely to notice
the additional overhead. Additionally, due to such low cost, the attacker can possibly monitor multiple
targets simultaneously.
Coarser observation From the queueing side channel, the attacker only can obtain estimations about the
sum of packet sizes arriving between successive pings and may miss some of the traffic, depending
on the probe frequency. This observation is coarser than previous traffic analysis work, where local
vantage points enable the attacker to gather information about every single packet, such as the exact
size and inter-packet delays. Thus the performance of a remote traffic analysis attack will generally
be worse than what is possible with local observations. We show that despite coarse observation we
are still able to reconstruct an alarming amount of information from remote hosts using the attack.
2.5 Feasibility
We have shown that the attacker can recover the user’s traffic pattern through the information leakage of the
queuing side channel. We now address the feasibility of our attack by further discussing the prevalence of
the conditions required for this attack.
2.5.1 ICMP support
The attack scenario we show above relies on ICMP probe packets, hence we care about whether ICMP
is enabled in real routers. In testing over 918 probable DSL hosts on the Internet, we found over 25%
responded to ping requests. Since we harvested these probable DSL hosts from the Internet over a period
of several months, it is not clear how many that failed to respond were simply down rather than blocking
our probes. Thus, we can assume that the fraction of hosts that respond to ping is even larger. Additionally,
in a brief survey of consumer-grade router hardware, we found that many of them do not perform ICMP
filtering, at least not in the default configuration. Moreover, even though the ping packets are blocked by
firewalls on some home routers, other forms of probes may be exploited as well; for example, if the home
router exposes TCP ports for file sharing or other applications, SYN packets can be used as probes with the
same effectiveness.
2.5.2 FIFO scheduling policy
The high correlation between Alice’s traffic pattern and Bob’s ping RTTs comes from the fact that the router
serves packets in FIFO order. Note that most home routers today do not use QoS extensions and schedule
packets on a given link in FIFO order. Thus, information leaked by these routers can be exploited with
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remote traffic analysis. Certainly, a fair queuing implementation [26] would reduce the impact that cross-
traffic would have on the probe sequence and hence reduce the effectiveness of the side channel, but not
entirely eliminate it [15].
2.5.3 Limited Last-hop Bandwidth
The information leaked through our side channel are the states of the queue length in the router’s buffer.
Hence, to have nontrivial queues built up in the buffer, the broadband link must have limited bandwidth
compared to the rest of the links in the path. In our experiments, we have used speeds typical of current home
broadband speeds—several Mbps, and our scheme worked well in those environments. The deployment of
faster links, such as Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH), may reduce the effectiveness of the queueing side channel,
but notice that if the core network is similarly upgraded in speed, the bandwidth disparity necessary for our
attack will remain.
2.5.4 Victim’s IP address
In our attack, Bob needs to know Alice’s IP address to send the probes. Although this mapping is typically
only explicitly known to ISPs, many protocols, such as file sharing, instant messaging, VoIP, and email,
will reveal the IP address of a user. Other forms of IP address reconnaissance may also be possible but are
outside the scope of this work.
3 Website Fingerprinting
Previous work on traffic analysis has shown that it is often possible to identify the website that someone is
visiting based on traffic timings and packet sizes [2, 11, 17], namely, website fingerprinting. We consider
whether it is possible to carry out a similar attack using our remote traffic analysis. We first review the three
basic steps in previous work when conducting a website fingerprinting attack.
1. First, the attacker decides some feature of web traffic used to distinguish websites. The feature needs
to stay relatively stable for accesses to the same single website, but has significant diversity across
different sites. For example, Herrmann et al. use the size distribution of HTTP packets [11].
2. The next step is the training procedure. The attacker needs a training data set of fingerprint samples
labeled with corresponding destination websites. Usually, these feature profiles are obtained by the
attacker browsing websites himself/herself from the same (or similar) network connection as the user.
3. In the final step, the attacker tests his knowledge from training on the victim user. He monitors traffic
going to the user and matches extracted features with the profiles in his database. The one with most
similarity is chosen as the website browsed by the user.
As compared with previous work, using our remote traffic analysis technique for identifying websites
introduces two additional challenges. First, previous work used fine-grained information like exact packet
size distributions to create features, whereas in our setting this information is not available directly, since the
queueing side channel produces only approximate sums of packet sizes. Second, previous work created a
training set from the same vantage point that was then used for fingerprinting tests. An attacker performing
remote traffic analysis must, of course, use a different environment for collecting the training set, potentially
affecting the measured features. We describe our approaches to solving these two challenges next.
3.1 Time Series–Based Feature
Since it is hard to infer information about each single packet from our recovered pattern time series, we
use the entire time series, which contains the estimated size of all HTTP packets downloaded during each
probe period, to create one fingerprint trace. Identification of websites is based on the similarity between
the observed fingerprints and samples in the training set.
The challenge is to find a meaningful distance between fingerprint traces. Note that pointwise com-
parisons will produce poor results. This is because parts of the fingerprint may be impacted by the noise
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from a small queueing delay on a core Internet link. Additionally, the fingerprint could miss some pack-
ets contained in the original traffic due to pattern recovery errors. Finally, even fingerprints of the same
website are not strictly synchronized in time due to the inter-packet delay variations. To deal with these
issues, we turn to the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance [24]. DTW was developed for use in speech
processing to account for the fact that when people speak, they pronounce various features of the phonemes
at different speeds, and do not always enunciate all of the features. DTW attempts to find the best align-
ment of two time series by creating a non-linear time warp between the sequences. Figure 5 visualizes the
DTW-based distance between two time series: A = {a1, a2 . . . , aI} and B = {b1, b2 . . . , bJ}. Let function
F (c) = {c(1), . . . , c(K)} be a mapping from series A to series B where c(k) = (a(i), b(j)). For every pair
of matched points based on the mapping, we define the distance as d(c(k)) = d(i, j) = |ai − bj |. The final
distance between the A and B can then be defined as a weighted and normalized sum over all matched point
pairs as D(A,B) = minF
{∑K
k=1 d(c(k))w(k)∑K
k=1 w(k)
}
. The weights w(k)’s are flexible parameters picked based on
the specific application scenario. Applying dynamic programming, one can find the warping function with
minimum distance, which captures the similarity between the two time series under best matched alignment.
AaIa1
B
b1
bJ
c(3) = (2, 3)
c(K) = (I, J)
a2
...
b2
. . .
Figure 5: Warping function in DTW
In our attack, we applies DTW-based distance
to account for the estimation errors and time desyn-
chronizations in fingerprints. Based on the dis-
tances with the training data set, the attacker will
know if a test sample indicates the activity that the
user browsed the website of interest.
3.2 Training Environment
To obtain an accurate training fingerprint for a par-
ticular user’s traffic, the attacker must be able to
replicate the network conditions on that user’s home
network. The approach we use is to set up a virtual
machine running a browser that is connected to the
Internet via a virtual Dummynet link [23]. The vir-
tual machine is then scripted to fetch a set of web
pages of interest; at the same time, an outside probe
is sent across the Dummynet link, simulating the at-
tack conditions on a real DSL link.
A number of parameters of the link need to be carefully decided. We found that the most important
parameter for the attacker to replicate was the link bandwidth. First, as discussed in §2.3, the probe frequency
should be adjusted based on the link bandwidth. Bandwidth also affects the magnitude of observed queuing
delays. Additionally, it can significantly alter the traffic pattern itself, as TCP congestion control mechanisms
are affected by the available bandwidth. Fortunately, estimating the bandwidth on a link is a well-studied
problem [20, 22, 28]. In our tests, we use a packet-train technique by sending a burst of probe packets and
measuring the rate at which responses are returned. Since most DSL lines have asymmetric bandwidth,
we used TCP ACK packets with 1000 data bytes to measure the download bandwidth on the link. The
target would send a short TCP reset packet for each ACK that it received, with the spacing between resets
indicating the downstream bandwidth; we found this method to be fairly accurate.
The round-trip time between the home router and the website hosts also affects the fingerprint. When
opening a webpage, the browser can download objects from several host servers. The traffic pattern is the
sum of all download connections, hence the shape of observed fingerprint does depend on the RTTs to these
servers. However, we did not explicitly model this parameter considering the difficulty to accurately tune
up the link delays to multiple destinations. The effects to the will be further discussed in §4.
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The fingerprint may be affected by the choice of browsers and operating systems as well; for best result,
the training environment should model the target as closely as possible. Information about browser and
operating system versions can be easily obtained if the target can be convinced to visit a website run by the
attacker; additionally, fingerprinting techniques in [18] may be used to recover some of this information.
3.3 Attack Scenarios
We consider several attack scenarios that make use of website fingerprinting. We can first consider the
classic website fingerprinting scenario: Bob obtains traces from Alice’s computer by sending probes to her
DSL router and compares them to fingerprints of websites that he has generated, in order to learn about
her browsing habits. Note that this can be seen as a classification task: each web request in Alice’s trace
is classified as belonging to a set of sites. This scenario has been used in most of the previous work on
website fingerprinting, but it introduces the requirement that Bob must know the set of potential sites that
Alice may visit. Without some prior information about Alice’s browsing habits, this potential set includes
every site on the Internet, making it infeasible to generate a comprehensive set of fingerprints. One could
create fingerprints for popular sites only, but this reduces the accuracy of the classification task [6, 11, 29].
For example, the top 1 000 US sites, as tracked by Alexa, are responsible for only 56% of all page views,
therefore, even a perfect classifier trained on the 1 000 sites would give the wrong result nearly half the
time.5
We therefore consider a different scenario, where Bob wants to detect whether Alice visits a particular
site. For example, if Bob is Alice’s employer, he may wish to check to see if she is considering going to
work for Bob’s competitor, Carol. To carry out this attack, Bob would create a fingerprint for Carol’s jobs
site; he would then perform a binary classification task on Alice’s traffic, trying to decide whether a trace
represents a visit to the target site or some other site on the Internet. As we will see, such binary classification
can be performed with relatively high accuracy for some choices of sites. Note that, as Alice’s employer,
Bob has plenty of opportunities to learn information about Alice’s home network, such as her IP address,
browser and operating system versions, and download bandwidth, by observing Alice when she connects to
a password-protected Intranet site, and can therefore use this information to create accurate training data for
building fingerprints.
As another example, Bob may be trying to identify an employee who makes posts to a web message
board critical of Bob.6 Bob can similarly build profiles, tailored for each employee’s home computer, of the
web board and perform remote traffic analysis. He can then correlate any detected matches to the times of
the posts by the offending pseudonym; note that this deanonymization attack is able to tolerate a significant
number of false-positive and false-negative errors by combining observations over many days to improve
confidence [7].
4 Evaluation
We next present our results of website detection attack. First, we describe the experimental setups and data
collection procedure.
4.1 Experimental Setups
We built a DSL-Setup consisting of a target system and a ping server, as shown in Figure 6(a). The target
system captured the real environment of a home user. It ran on a laptop, located in our city (inside US),
connected to DSL line with 3 Mbps download and 512 Kbps upload speeds. On the laptop, we used a shell
5In fact, the situation is even worse, since Alexa counts all page views within a certain top-level domain, whereas fingerprints
must be created on each individual URL.
6This example is motivated by several actual cases of companies seeking to do this; see https://www.eff.org/cases/
usa-technologies-v-stokklerk and https://www.eff.org/cases/first-cash-v-john-doe.
10
                                  
                                  
                                     
             
Internet
Website
Host
Website
HostDSL
Ping From 
Canada
(a) The DSL-Setup for test
                               
                          VMware ESX
                                                 
             
Ubuntu 
VM
Client
Virtual 
Router Dummynet Internet
Website
Host
Website
Host
Ping  
Host 
(b) The VM-Setup for training
Figure 6: Experimental setups for website detection
script to automatically load websites using Firefox 4.07. The ping server was a commercial hosting system,
located in the Canadian province of Quebec, acting as the remote attacker. It was scripted to send pings at
precise time intervals with hping8 and record ping traces with tcpdump9. We set the ping interval to 2 ms.
To emulate the attacker’s training procedure, we also built a VM-Setup, a VMware ESX host testbed
located in our lab, as shown in Figure 6(b). On this machine, we ran several VMware guest operating
systems: a Ubuntu VM Client, a virtual router and a host implementing a transparent Dummynet link. The
Ubuntu VM Client acted as a virtual target, and was scripted to browse websites using Firefox, similar to
the real home user. The virtual router provided NAT service for the client, and was connected to the Internet
through the Dummynet link. The Dummynet bridge was configured to replicate the network conditions of
the target DSL link (i.e., the bandwidths). As in the DSL-Setup, we sent probes from another host outside
the constrained Dummynet link to the virtual NAT router periodically. The attacker then collected training
fingerprints while the virtual client was browsing websites through this virtual ‘DSL’ link. Note the virtual
router and ping host were connected to the same dedicated high-speed LAN minimizing the impact of
additional noise added by intermediate routers or network congestion caused by other hosts.
4.2 Data Collection
We collected fingerprints of the front pages for 1000 websites on the top list on Alexa10. For websites which
have multiple mirrors in different countries like www.google.com, we only considered the site with the
highest rank. We excluded websites with extremely large loading time (greater than 60 s). For each website,
we collected 12 fingerprint samples from both the DSL and VM setups. The delay between collecting two
samples is half an hour. Following the same assumptions in previous papers [11, 17], the browsers were
configured appropriately (no caching, no automatic update checks and no unnecessary plugins). This makes
our results comparable with previous work.
4.3 Website Detection
We first analyze the ability of an attacker to detect whether a user visits a particular site. To do so, the attacker
checks whether the distance between the user trace and the target web site is smaller than some threshold,
and if so, the web site is considered detected. This is a binary classification task and its performance can
be characterized by the rates of false positives—a different website incorrectly identified as the target–and
7http://www.mozilla.com/firefox/
8http://www.hping.org
9http://www.tcpdump.org
10http://www.alexa.com
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false negatives–the target website not being identified. The choice of threshold t creates a tradeoff between
the two rates: a smaller threshold will decrease false positives at the expense of false negatives.
To estimate false-positive rate given a particular threshold ν, we fix a target site t and use the 12 samples
T = {st,1, . . . , st,12} as the training set. We use the samples from the other sites as a test set; i.e., U = {si,j}
for i 6= t, j ∈ {1, . . . , 12}. Given a sample si,j ∈ U , we calculate the average distance from it to the training
samples:
dt(si,j) =
∑12
k=1D(si,j , st,k)
12
(4)
where D(·, ·) is the DTW-based distance function defined in §3.1. We then consider every sample si,j ∈ U
such that dt(si,j) < ν to be a false positive and therefore estimate the false-positive rate:
pˆt =
|{si,j ∈ U |dt(si,j) < ν}|
|U | (5)
To estimate the false-negative rate, we pick one of the sample st,i and calculate its average distance to
the other 11 samples st,j , j 6= i, and count it as a false negative if the distance is at least ν. We then repeat
this process for each i = 1, . . . , 12:
qˆt =
∣∣∣{st,i|i ∈ {1, . . . , 12},∑i 6=j d(st,i, st,j)/11 ≥ ν}∣∣∣
12
(6)
Given a target false positive rate of p∗t , we can calculate the threshold ν∗t that would ensure pt < p∗t .
Note that because pˆt is only an estimate of pt, we calculate a 95% confidence interval for pt and chose ν
such that the upper limit of the CI is below p∗t 11. Note that this threshold will be different for each site. We
can then estimate the corresponding false negative rate qˆ∗t that corresponds to ν∗t .
The target false positive rate will largely depend on the prior knowledge the attacker has. Typically, we
will want to aim for a small false-positive rate, since even if Bob considers it likely that Alice does in fact
visit the target site t at some point, most of the web browsing in any trace will still be to other sites; thus a
low false-positive rate is needed for the test to have high positive predictive value. On the other hand, Bob
can easily tolerate a moderate false-negative rate, since even if he only finds out about employees searching
for other jobs 90%, or even 50% of the time, this information is useful nevertheless. Likewise, perfect
detection is not needed for the potential attack to have a chilling effect on Alice’s behavior.
Figure 7 shows the false negative rates that can be achieved given a target false-positive rate of 0.5%,
1%, and 5%. Each bar represents a cumulative number of websites, i.e., websites for which qˆ∗t is at or
below the x-axis value. We show two sets of results; one using the VM setup for training and DSL for
testing (Figure 7(a)) and one using the DSL samples for both training and test data sets (Figure 7(b)). Note
that there is a significant difference between the two graphs, resulting from the discrepancies between the
simulated (VM) and the test environment. We expect that, with some work, an attacker may be able to reduce
such discrepancies by more carefully tuning the parameters of the virtual machine and the simulated link,
or by using actual hardware and a real DSL line that mimics Alice’s setup. The DSL–DSL case therefore
shows the limits of what can be achieved by improving the training environment.
An important observation is that, in both cases, the success of the web detection is highly dependent on
the target site. For a small number of sites—75 in the VM–DSL case and 320 in the DSL–DSL case—the
web detection attack works very well: we are able to maintain a very low false-positive rate of 0.5% while
experiencing few false negatives (17% or below). On the other hand, some sites are virtually invulnerable
11We use a binomial proportion confidence interval here. This is slightly imprecise, as the 12 · 999 samples are not independent;
we leave computation of confidence intervals that take this into account for future work.
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Figure 7: Number of sites with a given false negative rateor smaller.
to our attack: for 65 of the sites we tested, we were unable to observe any true positives with a target false-
positive rate of 5% (i.e., qˆ∗t = 1), even in the best-case DSL–DSL scenario. We found these sites to have
either very short traces, making it difficult to distinguish them from other such sites, or highly variable traffic
patterns due, for example, to dynamic content, making it difficult to create a useful fingerprint.
4.4 Deanonymization
We next consider the deanonymization attack described in §3.3. As a case study, we considered the site
www.warriorforum.com, a popular Internet marketing forum. It uses the vBulletin software, which was, as
of August 2011, the most popular bulletin board software12, and thus should be representative of a number
of other sites. In our attack scenario, Bob wishes to find out if Alice is using a particular pseudonym (say,
“diane123”) to post on the site. To accomplish this, he first collects traces from Alice’s home computer for
a period of time. He then waits for posts to the forum from diane123 and performs a detection attack to see
if Alice was visiting the site at the time of post. Repeated successful matches can then be used to obtain
increasing confidence in tying Alice to diane123.
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Figure 8: Detection performance for Warrior Forum
when training with the correct page and when using
other pages.
Note that Bob will need to build a profile that
targets internal pages of www.warriorforum.
com, rather than the front page. Alice’s post
requests will be too small to create an easily-
observable feature; however, vBulletin displays the
forum thread after a post has been made. Therefore,
Bob can collect samples visiting threads where di-
ane123 has posted to create a fingerprint. Note that,
in this attack, fingerprint creation happens after the
trace collection. A problem facing Bob is that dif-
ferent post pages on Warrior Forum will have simi-
lar features in their RTT profile. A match, therefore,
can show that Alice visited some Warrior Forum
page with high confidence, but it may not have been
the correct thread. Even this information, however,
is likely to be enough for deanonymization. For example, Alexa shows that fewer than 1% of US Internet
users actually visit the Warrior Forum, and those that do tend to stay on the site less than 10 minutes on av-
12http://www.big-boards.com/statistics/
13
erage. If we make the simplifying assumptions that these visits are distributed randomly across a three-hour
evening period, the additional false-positive rate due to random visits to other Warrior Forum pages is no
more than 6%, even if Alice is known to be a Warrior Forum user. Combining observations across several
posts allows Bob to improve his confidence.
Over a long term, even simpler attacks may suffice: since most people’s Internet usage is bursty, simply
observing that Alice always actively used the Internet in some way whenever diane123 made posts can be
used for deanonymization [7]. Likewise, Bob may be able to rule out Alice as a suspect if she was known
to be at home (due to recent DSL activity) but her connection was idle at the times of the target posts.
Finally, Bob may be able to use the similarity between internal forum pages to his advantage. In partic-
ular, suppose that Alice publicly participates in the forum under her real identity, in addition to potentially
posting under a pseudonym. Bob can use the times of Alice’s posts under her real name to label traces
collected from Alice’s computer and create a training set. In this case, Bob does not need to simulate Alice’s
computing environment as the training and test environments are exactly the same—the ideal conditions
we used in the DSL–DSL case. To study this attack, we collected samples from 100 different posts on the
Warrior Forum site. For each sample, we attempt to match it to a fingerprint created from the other 99 posts;
our process is similar to (6), except using a different for each sample. From this, we estimate the false nega-
tive rate for a given target false-positive rate, calculated using (5), using the traces from 999 other websites.
Figure 8 shows the results. The use of different pages to test degrades the matching performance, but it still
provides sufficient detection power for deanonymization after a few posts.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss about some limitations of our work.
1. Multiple users. In the scenario of our remote traffic analysis, the attacker’s probes cannot distinguish
between the traffic of multiple users on the same link, so shared broadband connections present an
obstacle to our attack. However, even in multi-user installations, it is still common for only one user
to be using the Internet at any given point during the day. Some previous work on traffic analysis has
used blind source separation to separate traffic from multiple users [35]; similar techniques may be
applicable here. For example, in Figure 2, traffic follows a periodic pattern based on the RTT between
Alice and the website; such periodicity might help separate the sources.
2. Dynamic nature of websites. Our attack relies on web sites having relatively stable fingerprints. Al-
though the overall pattern captured by our RTT probes remains static enough within days, the website
content may incur significant changes (e.g., site redesigns) over time; which in turn will result in a
change of its fingerprint. Thus, for best results, the training set should be updated continuously. This
limitation applies to any website fingerprinting approach even local website fingerprinting techniques
which benefit from better vantage points [11, 17].
3. Content distribution networks. Websites that use content distribution networks (CDNs) will use dif-
ferent servers to deliver content based on the user’s location. They may present localized versions
of the site to users in different countries or regions. As shown in our experimental results, this can
cause fingerprints to differ significantly. If identifying these sites is a high priority for the attacker,
additional work would be needed to obtain fingerprints of the right version by, for example, using
proxies and other techniques to fool IP-based localization.
4. Cache issues In our tests, we followed the assumption in previous work [11, 17] and disabled the
cache in the browser. This implies that our results demonstrates the attacker’s ability to verify that a
user visits a web page for the first time. To investigate cases with cache enabled, one possible solution
would be build separate fingerprints based on the time since the site was first downloaded, e.g., after
1 hour, 6 hours, 1 day, 1 week, to minimize the effect that caching would have on the attack. Note
that with continuous observation of a computer, the attacker may be able to guess how long ago the
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last visit was.
6 Related Work
The use of network probes to infer information about traffic at a remote location has been explored in previ-
ous work in the context of anonymous communication networks. Murdoch and Danezis used a remote traffic
analysis approach to expose the identity of relays participating in a circuit in the Tor [8] and MorphMix [21]
anonymous communication networks [19]. Their approach was to send an on–off pattern of high-volume
traffic through the anonymous tunnel and a low-volume probe to a router under test. If the waiting times of
the probe showed a corresponding increase during the “on” periods, the router was assumed to be routing the
flow. However, when Murdoch and Danezis evaluated their attack, the Tor network was lightly loaded and
consisted only of 13 relays; to repeat their attack on today’s network, with around 2 000 relays and high traf-
fic load13, an attacker would needs extremely large amounts of bandwidth to measure enough relays during
the attack window. Evans et al. [9] strengthened Murdoch and Danezis’s attack of by a bandwidth amplifi-
cation attack which make their attack feasible in modern-day deployment of Tor. Hopper et al. [13, 14] use
a combination of Murdoch and Danezis’s approach and pairwise round trip times (RTTs) between Internet
nodes to correlate Tor nodes to likely clients. Chakravarty et al. [3] propose an attack for exposing Tor re-
lays participating in a circuit of interest by modulating the bandwidth of an anonymous connection and then
using available bandwidth estimation to observe this pattern as it propagates through the Tor network. Note
that these techniques relied on detecting a specially-crafted coarse-grained communication pattern, whereas
our attacks make use of fine-grained information obtained through remote traffic analysis.
We also survey previous work on recovering information about encrypted HTTP traffic. The fact that
object sizes could be used to infer sensitive information, even after encryption, was first mentioned by
Yee (as related by Wagner and Schneier [30]). A specific concern listed by Yee is that the particular page
within a site accessed by the user could be revealed by considering URL and object lengths. Chen et al. [4]
applied this observation to AJAX applications to recover detailed information about the internal state of the
application and users’ data.
Cheng et al. [5] present the earliest implementation of website fingerprinting. The classification features
used in their scheme are the object sizes and the HTML file sizes. Hintz [12] and Sun et al. [29] both consider
website fingerprinting attacks in SSL-encrypted HTTP connections. Their classification features are object
sizes and counts. While Hintz did not present implementation details and experimental results, Sun et al.
use a Jaccard’s coefficient based classifier and show that their attack can achieve a correct identification rate
of 75%.
Instead of looking at web objects, Bissias et al. [2], Liberatore et al. [17], and Herrmann et al. [11] study
the statistical characteristics of individual packets in the traffic flows. Bissias et al. use packet sizes and inter-
arrival timings as classification features. Their method is fragile to the changes in the network environment,
as the inter-arrival timing is highly dependent on the specific routing path and varies from time to time. To
address this problem, Liberatore et al. only use packet sizes and counts in classification. They implement
both Jaccard coefficient and Naı¨ve Bayes classifier, and show the efficacy of the attack in practice. Using
similar scheme, Herrmann et al. further improve the classification accuracy using Multinomial Naı¨ve Bayes
classifier.
7 Conclusion
We show that traffic analysis attacks can be carried out remotely, without access to the analyzed traffic,
thus greatly increasing the attack surface and lowering the barrier to entry for conducting the attack. We
identify a queuing side channel that can be used to infer the queue size of a given link with good accuracy
and thus monitor traffic patterns. We show how this channel can be used to carry out a remote attack to
13See http://torstatus.blutmagie.de (retrieved November 2010)
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detect a remote user’s browsing patterns. This highlights the importance of traffic analysis attacks in today’s
connected Internet.
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